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My presentation paper Research and Innovation Systems for Digital Content and Applications, as 
you may know, if you have had a chance to look at it, is a slightly dated paper from 2003/2004 
which I, along with other colleagues, co-authored with Terry Cutler.  I will briefly start with that, 
and also reflect on two of the background papers for the symposium: the ‘four models’ paper, and 
the social networks paper.  I title my paper ‘the parallel universes of innovation policy and creative 
industries policy, and the growing convergence between them’.  It has a sub-title which comes from 
a comment a senior bureaucrat made to me when I was seeking to lobby him about creative 
industries in Queensland. He said, ‘so you want us to stop trying to find the cure for cancer and start 
funding reality TV, do you?’  That I think brings out the contrast that I am trying to track here a 
little.   
 
So, I’ll talk about the parallel universes briefly. Some of this will be familiar to most of you, I’ll talk 
a little about how it’s changing and where I think we are at at the moment.  Innovation policy and 
innovation systems approaches are a relatively new public policy framework, which has probably 
really only been in place for a couple of decades and that means that they are still in a state of real 
contestability.  One reason why they are contestable is that they undercut the logic of what a 
political economist would call neo-liberal rationales for small government, for deregulation and for 
getting out of the way and letting markets work.  Innovation policy has been made in a context in 
which western governments have re-introduced themselves to an active interventionary role in a 
number of areas where they spent a couple of decades getting out of in the 1970s and 80s, in the 
post stagflation era and the end of the Keynesian settlement.  The innovation policy framework is a 
value-driven orientation to productivity rather than a cost-efficiency driver for intervention and in 
that sense it is in contrast to micro-economic rationales for change and reform - which were the 
mantra of western governments’ strategy into the late 1980s and early 1990s.   
 
It is also contestable because for Treasury officials it’s regarded as industry policy (‘picking 
winners’, propping up failing manufacturing sectors, slowing tariff reform, etc) by another name 
and therefore highly suspect.  But I think that it does represent a historic shift in the ways in which 
government has thought of an appropriate role for intervention.  This has led to a disposition to 
focus on emerging industries that exhibit innovation and R&D intensity, upskilling and education of 
the population, and a focus on universalising the benefits of connectivity through mass ICT literacy 
upgrades. 
 
The innovation policy paradigm 
But the innovation policy paradigm has tended to stabilise around - and possibly congeal into - the 
normative frameworks found in the Oslo manuals and the Frascati protocols. In the Oslo manual, 
you will see what, in the literature, is usually regarded as the ‘first generation’ of innovation policy 
- that is the idea of a linear process of the development of innovation.  This process begins with 
basic knowledge breakthroughs courtesy of laboratory science and public funding of pure or basic 
research, and moves through successive stages - seeding, pre-commercial, testing, prototyping and 
the sequestering of IP - until new knowledge is built into commercial applications that diffuse 
through widespread consumer and business adoption.  The prototypical industries, as we know, that 
have fitted these characteristics have been biotech and pharmaceuticals.  The literature that is 
alluded to in the presentation paperwork (Lengrand et al (2002); Rothwell (1994)) talks about the 
evolution of the innovation paradigm. Some talk about three stages of innovation or even of five 
generations. Basically, though, it’s a case of complicating this linear model where contemporary 
accounts take account of the complex iterative, non-linear nature of innovation with many feedback 
loops along the way, and seek to bolster the process by emphasising the importance of systems 
infrastructures and attributes that support innovation.   
 
The presentation paper Research and Innovation Systems for Digital Content and Applications was 
an attempt a few years ago to apply this thinking quasi-systematically to the content industries - 
which it had never been applied to before either in Australia or elsewhere. It sought to identify with 
some degree of empirical rigor where the gaps are in the national innovation system: if one was to 
apply this approach to the contribution of the content industries to Australia’s national innovation 
system, what would you have to do to make it work?   
 
I won’t go into the detail of that work now.  While we can observe this migration from a simplistic 
"technology push" model of innovation driven by upstream R&D to the more real-world 
characterization of industry markets as complex systems in the innovation literature, old paradigms 
die hard in the real world of policy.  There is a significant gap between the policy literature and the 
policy institutions.  This is because science and research institutions change slowly.  This has also 
been compounded by the false dichotomy between "hard" science and manufacturing policy on the 
one hand, and the "soft" research of the social and humanistic sciences, and the relative neglect of 
the services sector within industry policy, on the other.  And of course the creative industries and 
digital content fall between this gap - on the one hand they are technology enabled; on the other 
hand they are seen very much as the soft end of the industry spectrum.   
 
The creative industries side of the parallel universe 
We now look at the other part of the parallel universe - on the creative industries side. I ask you to 
keep in mind Jason and my background paper on the ‘four models’ of the creative industries, and 
think about the first two models. This is a paper that talks about four potential models of the relation 
of creative industries to the rest of the economy.  The first model poses a negative relationship - 
where transfers occur from the rest of the economy into culture in order to address non-market and 
market failure aspects of support for the traditional arts. The second is what we call the competitive 
model, where the established media (broadcasting, music industries, print and so on) have 
essentially a neutral relationship, they behave like other industries and their unusual characteristics 
such as power law and information failure characteristics are addressable under competitive 
conditions.  Keep in mind those two models when I talk about the ‘parallel universe’ of the creative 
industries.   
 
There are three points I want to make about them.  These points all relate to why there is this 
parallel universe, in other words there has really been no connection between the creative industries 
and innovation thinking for most of the history of both of these discourses.  The first point is 
category confusion. There is a significant ongoing issue of what do we mean when we talk about 
the creative industries.  Are we talking about the copyright industries, the content industries, the 
cultural industries, digital content or are we talking about arts or entertainment or something in 
addition?  This category confusion means that it is extremely difficult to gather accurate, 
authoritative and timely data about sectors and that it is subject to unfocused analysis and 
intervention.  Various attempts have been made to systematise this and I will allude to one of them 
later with some of the work we have done.   
 
Second, theoretical contestability. In the cultural sphere, we have been our own worst enemy in 
many ways. There is a remarkable degree of critique in the academic field but also amongst policy 
and industry about this notion of creative industries and some of you will be aware of some of the 
literature in this field.  Let me remark very briefly on one such critique which I regard as being 
emblematic of many. This is the work of Nicholas Garnham, whose an article in the International 
Journal of Cultural Policy a few years ago focuses on the core intellectual lineage of the 
information society and its fatal links with creative industries.  
 
Creative industries ideas are a kind of Trojan Horse, secreting the intellectual heritage of the 
information society and its technocratic baggage into the realm of cultural practice, suborning the 
latter’s proper claims on the public purse and self-understanding, and aligning it with inappropriate 
bedfellows such as business services, telecommunications and calls for increases in generic 
business creativity. Garnham rests his case on the normative imperative to return to the ‘cultural 
industries’ policy focus on distribution (critique of multimedia conglomeration) and consumption 
(smoothing of the popular market for culture for access and equity) of which he was a main 
proponent in the 1980s. He names as his bete noir Schumpeterian approaches to entrepreneurialism, 
the technological sublime as epitomised in Ithiel de Sola Pool’s work, and of course the ‘pervasive 
‘neo-liberalism’ ungirding the claims for the Information Society.  I am not going to go into what 
we might say in response to that, it is important to simply register that there is a strong sense of 
incompatibility held by academic theorists, as well as industry and policy people in the cultural 
field, that this Trojan horse threatens the status quo.   
 
The third one is policy marginalisation.  Let me quickly quote a couple of concrete examples of 
this.  The Australian Income Assessment Act Section 73B 2C(f) sets out what can qualify as 
allowable research and development for tax concession purposes - people from Britain will be 
familiar with a similar regime there. To qualify for the concession, R&D must be ‘systematic, 
investigative and experimental’. The activity must involve ‘an appreciable element of novelty’, a 
‘high level of technical risk’, and ‘be carried on for the purpose of acquiring new knowledge 
(whether or not that knowledge will have a specific practical application) or creating new or 
improved materials, products, devices, processes or services’. 
 
The entire field of the humanities, arts and social sciences are excluded from this domain 
exclusively on the basis that they do not generate knowledge of this type or undergo processes of 
knowledge production of this type and so what is currently a $460 million exercise in this country 
of providing tax breaks to industry for qualifying research and development doesn’t apply in the 
creative industries.  This goes back, of course, to the normative framework of the Oslo manual and 
what is accepted as R&D.  
 
We could go through a number of points about the creative industries and why both in their own 
self understanding and in terms of policy marginalisation they have never positioned themselves as 
being a field that requires or describes itself as having a value chain that has R&D in it.  The main 
point I want to make about that is that the large industries that make up the high profile aspects of 
the creative industries are the large multinational commercial firms – who simply have no interest 
in qualifying for such a concession. They don’t need it, by and large, and they don’t see themselves 
as actually undergoing that kind of process in order to generate the products and services that they 
do.  My assertion would be that they indeed have absolutely demonstrable R&D processes but they 
have never had to frame them for the purposes of government surveillance, and so the whole area of 
innovation and R&D policy simply has passed the creative industries by.  
 
This has certain consequences particularly because this sector is predominantly composed of SMEs 
not of large firms. The great preponderance of firms are SMEs who indeed are those who should be 
able to access such support as export development assistance, R&D concessions and the panoply of 
industry schemes which our study Research and Innovation Systems for Digital Content and 
Applications demonstrated has almost completely passed them by.   
 
How is this changing? 
So how is this changing? On the innovation side, policy is catching up with the academic literature 
and there is a much greater emphasis on services innovation. The size of the services sector is 
beginning to attract attention, the assumptions of services as parasitic on more established primary 
and secondary industries has broken down, and there is a greater sense of the porosity between the 
manufacturing and services industries.  The attention to services is complicating the linear model 
because services don’t obey this model. There is more attention on public sector innovation because 
services are very much what the public sector provides, more routinely and normatively than the 
private sector.   
 
This has propelled a fundamental shift in the rationale for public policy in this field. ‘System 
failure’, rather than market failure, is the basis on which governments can with some confidence 
proceed to develop policies and invest in innovation on a sound rationale. ‘System failure not 
market failure’ is a recognition that many generative aspects of the innovation process lie outside 
the market economy, not only in terms of breakthrough science but also public and household sector 
innovation, and unplanned innovation at the final consumption end. It also implies a central role for 
government not only in providing key elements in the NIS (agencies, departments, schooling 
systems, etc), but also in identifying that the linkages between elements which make the system 
work are robust and optimal. Where links are missing, suboptimal, or not even thought of, 
government has a role in identifying such systems failure and bringing to bear resources to address 
the problem. 
 
And so public sector innovation branches out of the narrow commercialisation paradigm that 
attended the linear model – the first generation model – and is driving more and more towards a 
wider agenda, particularly for our purposes with the question of user-generated innovation, of 
consumer-led change and innovation and that is being picked up in business more and more.  
Richard Lyons of Goldman Sachs says in rich countries about four-fifths of economic activity now 
involves services, but profit margins are eroding. He argues that ‘commoditisation often occurs 
even faster in services than in physical products, because innovations are easier to copy, patents can 
provide less protection, up-front costs are lower and product cycles are shorter’. The question of 
user-generated innovation, user-generated content is as much on the lips of business as it is on the 
lips of the academic vanguard.  And indeed science is becoming increasingly aware of the open 
innovation paradigm that Cheeseborough and Von Hippel and others have talked about for some 
time.   
 
On the creative industries side, how are things changing? Again, I invoke the third and fourth 
models in the ‘Four models’ paper: the third model focuses on the idea of the high growth rate of 
the creative industries, in some cases twice as high as the economy as a whole.  This is suggesting 
that we have a sector that is dynamic, that has a positive relationship rather than a negative or 
neutral relationship to the rest of the economy, that it’s driving growth in some respects and the four 
models paper suggests some ways in which we can point to that.  One in particular is the shift from 
thinking of the creative industries as a sector, as a set of outputs in industry terms to a set of inputs 
into the rest of the economy. Increasing work is being done on this and we’ve contributed to it with 
work on creative workforce covering Australia, the UK and New Zealand. We’ve talked about the 
extent to which creative employment in the rest of the economy is greater than employment within 
the creative industries, so creatives are found more outside the creative industries than inside them. 
The implications of this for knowledge transfer and for the so-called creative economy is beginning 
to be put together.  So, model three tells us something about the beginnings of an innovation 
approach to the creative industries, and a further example is report from NESTA in the UK, 
Creating Innovation: Do the Creative Industries support innovation in the wider economy? – an 
input:output analysis that seeks to answer that question in the affirmative.   
 
Model four, as you might expect, is the most speculative of the four models and it is saying that 
instead of thinking of creative industries as the sector, or thinking of it as the driver of GDP growth 
in standard macroeconomic terms, think of it more as a co-ordinating mechanism or - in John 
Hartley’s terms - an enabling social technology for distributed innovation. If you begin to think of it 
in those terms we’re obviously into more speculative grounds but into grounds that then connect up 
with the notion of ‘social network markets’ which is the topic of the other background paper 
relevant to this presentation.   
 
Where are we now?   
I think these parallel universes are coming together, if you look at some of the examples of recent 
innovation policy formulation and creative industries formulation. There are two interesting 
examples that can be pointed to from the UK in early 2008: 22 February saw the launch of Creative 
Britain and on 18 March the launch of the innovation white paper - Innovation Nation. These two 
together form a very interesting combination of contemporary approaches to creative industries and 
innovation and I think that in those we see the consolidation of a rapprochment.  Policy is catching 
up with theory which is itself catching up with the theme of this workshop: ‘creative destruction’ of 
old forms of thinking of value creation and new ways in which the market and the non-market 
sectors are being thought through and the kinds of affordances that digital literacy and the internet is 
providing for that.   
